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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE PROBLEM WITH NEUROLAW

DAVID W. OPDERBECK*
ABSTRACT
This Article describes and critiques the increasingly popular program of
reductive neuroLaw. Law has irrevocably entered the age of neuroscience.
Various institutes and conferences are devoted to questions about the relation
between neuroscience and legal procedures and doctrines. Most of the new
“neuroLaw” scholarship focuses on evidentiary and related issues, and is
important and beneficial. But some versions of reductive neuroLaw are
frightening. Although they claim to liberate us from false conceptions of
ourselves and to open new spaces for more scientific applications of the law,
they end up stripping away all notions of “selves” and of “law.” This Article
argues that a revitalized sense of transcendence is required to avoid the violent
metaphysics of reductive neuroLaw and to maintain the integrity of both “law”
and “science.”

* Professor of Law, Seton Hall University Law School, and Director, Gibbons Institute of Law,
Science & Technology. Thanks to Brian Tamanaha, Brad Gregory, Dennis Patterson, and
Michael Pardo for helpful comments on earlier versions of this Article.
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INTRODUCTION
Genetics may yet threaten privacy, kill autonomy, make society homogeneous
and gut the concept of human nature. But neuroscience could do all of these
1
things first.

Law has entered the age of neuroscience. Various institutes and
conferences are devoted to questions about the relation between neuroscience
and legal procedures and doctrines.2 The MacArthur Foundation recently
awarded a $4.85 million grant for a Center of Law and Neuroscience at
Vanderbilt University.3
Most of the new “neuroLaw” scholarship is important and beneficial.
NeuroLaw scholars are seeking to better understand, for example, how
diagnostic tools such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) might
or might not be useful as evidence in the courtroom.4 Such evidence might
help determine the presence of brain injury in a negligence case, assess mental
capacity in a competency hearing, or define “brain death” for purposes of
interpreting a medical advance directive.5 More controversially, fMRI
evidence could bear on the mens rea requirement in criminal law when the
defendant suffers from some mental defect, or on whether a witness is telling
the truth.6 Such uses of the best available empirical science to help clarify the
application of legal rules represent the way in which the law’s general
principles become instantiated in particular situated contexts.
But some versions of reductive neuroLaw are frightening. Although they
claim to liberate us from false conceptions of ourselves and to open new spaces
for more scientific applications of the law, they end up stripping away all
notions of “selves” and of “law.” They propose not a concept of the “rule of
law,” but instead a dictatorship of the brain—or of some model of the brain—
and “neural reeducation camps” for those whose brains do not quite fall in

1. The Ethics of Brain Science: Open Your Mind, THE ECONOMIST, May 25, 2002, at 93.
2. See, e.g., THE MACARTHUR FOUNDATION RESEARCH NETWORK ON LAW AND
NEUROSCIENCE, http://www.lawneuro.org/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2013); Law and Neuroscience,
VANDERBILT UNIV., http://www.psy.vanderbilt.edu/courses/neurolaw/ (last visited Sept. 18,
2013) (listing American law schools that offer “Law and Neuroscience” classes); NEUROETHICS
& LAW BLOG, http://kolber.typepad.com/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2013); Society for Evolutionary
Analysis of Law, VANDERBILT UNIV., https://www4.vanderbilt.edu/seal/ (last visited Sept. 18,
2013).
3. Amy Wolf, Landmark Law and Neuroscience Network Expands at Vanderbilt,
VANDERBILT UNIV. (Aug. 24, 2011, 10:47 AM), http://news.vanderbilt.edu/2011/08/grant-willexpand-law-neuroscience-network/.
4. See, e.g., Neal Feigenson, Brain Imaging and Courtroom Evidence: On the Admissibility
and Persuasiveness of fMRI, in LAW, MIND AND BRAIN 23 (Michael Freeman & Oliver R.
Goodenough eds., 2009).
5. Id. at 25.
6. Id.
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line.7 In this respect, reductive neuroLaw represents the apotheosis of the
modern drive to replace law with science. This drive must be resisted and
reversed if law and science are each to retain their integrity.
Part I of this Article describes the increasingly popular program of
reductive neuroLaw and surveys the basis for that program in
paleoanthropology and sociobiology. Part II excavates the philosophical roots
of attempts to reduce “law” to “science,” of which neuroLaw is the most recent
manifestation, and shows that those roots extend to medieval theologies of
voluntarism, nominalism, and univocity. Part III demonstrates why reductive
neuroLaw represents a form of neuro-fascism. Part IV surveys some alternative
approaches to and critiques of neuroLaw. Part V argues that a revitalized sense
of transcendence is required to avoid the violent metaphysics of reductive
neuroLaw.
I. THE OUTLINES OF REDUCTIVE NEUROLAW
A.

The Claims of Reductive NeuroLaw

Reductive neuroscience suggests that “the brain is a physical entity
governed by the principles and rules of the physical world” and that “brain
determines the mind.”8 Contemporary neuroscience thereby claims to elide the
soul and the mind—what many neuroscientists call the “ghost in the
machine.”9 As Martha Farah of the University of Pennsylvania’s Center for
Neuroscience and Society puts it:
[A]s neuroscience begins to reveal the mechanisms of personality, character,
and even sense of spirituality, [dualism] becomes strained. If these are all
features of the machine, why have a ghost at all? By raising questions like this,
it seems likely that neuroscience will pose a far more fundamental challenge to
10
religion than evolutionary biology.

Not just religion, but law as well, can be reduced to neuroscience. Legal
theorists have not missed the implications of the new reductive sociobiology
and neuroscience for “folk” concepts of the rule of law. Farah notes with some
understatement that "[t]he idea that behavior is determined by physical causes

7. See infra Part II.
8. NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW: BRAIN, MIND, AND THE SCALES OF JUSTICE 8 (Brent
Garland ed., 2004).
9. Id. at 66. This phrase was originally introduced by Gilbert Ryle in 1949. GILBERT RYLE,
THE CONCEPT OF MIND 15–16 (1949).
10. Martha Farah, Neuroethics, VIRTUAL MENTOR (Aug. 2004), http://virtualmentor.amaassn.org/2004/08/oped2-0408.html.
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is hard to reconcile with the intuitive notions of free will and moral agency on
which our legal systems are based.”11
“Free will” is an illusion, many neuroLaw scholars argue. Among their
most compelling bits of evidence for this claim are studies suggesting that the
brain signals the body to engage in actions before we become consciously
aware of the action we will take.12 This “precognition” suggests that our
actions are automatic responses to stimuli and that our conscious “decisions”
are merely ex post determinations not to “veto” what the brain has already
signaled its readiness to do. We have, at best, “free won’t” rather than “free
will.”13 Therefore, “[a]ccording to neuroscience, no one person is more or less
responsible than any other for actions. We are all part of a deterministic system
that some day, in theory, we will completely understand.”14 In this view, the
notion of “responsibility” is only a “social construct,” law is an instrumentalist
tool useful for engineering the society we are constructing, and the society we
are constructing ultimately is reducible to the evolutionary history embedded
in our brains.
B.

Please Prepare for Your Prefrontal Workout

One prominent advocate of this vision for neuroLaw is David Eagleman,
Director of the Initiative for Neuroscience and the Law at the Baylor College
of Medicine in Houston, Texas.15 Eagleman states the issue for neuroLaw as
follows: “The crux of the question is whether all of your actions are
fundamentally on autopilot or whether there is some little bit that is ‘free’ to
choose, independent of the rules of biology.”16
Eagleman offers a seemingly mundane example: the everyday activity of
driving home from work and opening the front door of one’s home.17 Most of
us will realize, if we reflect on these actions once we are comfortably seated on
the couch after a long day, perhaps with a cold beer in hand and a football

11. Martha Farah, Responsibility and Brain Function, CTR. FOR NEUROSCIENCE & SOC’Y AT
UNIV. OF PA., http://neuroethics.upenn.edu/index.php/penn-neuroethics-briefing/responsibility-abrain-function (last visited Sept. 6, 2013).
12. Michael S. Gazzaniga & Megan S. Steven, Free Will in the Twenty-first Century, in
NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW: BRAIN, MIND, AND THE SCALES OF JUSTICE 51, 56 (Brent
Garland ed., 2004). These experiments, originally conducted by Benjamin Libet in the 1970’s,
may not in fact support such sweeping conclusions. See, e.g., Daniel C. Dennett, The Self as a
Responding—and Responsible—Artifact, 1001 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 39, 39–50 (2003).
13. Gazzaniga & Steven, supra note 12, at 57.
14. Id. at 68.
15. See Neuroscience and the Law, THE INITIATIVE ON NEUROSCIENCE & L. AT BAYLOR
COLLEGE OF MED., http://www.neulaw.org/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2013).
16. DAVID M. EAGLEMAN, INCOGNITO: THE SECRET LIVES OF THE BRAIN 166 (2011)
(emphasis omitted).
17. Id. at 141–42.
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game on the television, that we drove home on mental auto-pilot and that we
opened the door to our homes without thinking about the location of the
doorknob. If our route had been changed because of road construction, or if our
significant other had installed a new door with a different type of opener,
things would have been different: these new facts would have required greater
attentiveness. For Eagleman, this means that the conscious aspect of returning
home from work is only a “little bit” of the story: once we become habituated
to the routine, it becomes automatic.18 The same is true, he argues, for all of
our actions, including what we mistakenly attribute to intentionality.19
Indeed, in a recent interview, Eagleman acknowledged that his view of
neurobiology undermines libertarian notions of personal autonomy and free
will.20 Asked whether neuroscience completely erodes, or at least challenges,
the notion of individual autonomy, he replied, “I’m afraid it does,” “[Y]ou are
your biology,” and “[W]hat I’m pretty certain about now is that to whatever
extent we have free will it is only a bit player in what actually happens in
people’s lives.”21
Eagleman asserts that “[t]he unique patterns of neurobiology inside each of
our heads cannot qualify as choices; these are the cards we’re dealt.”22 He
suggests that “it is difficult to find the gap into which to slip free will—the
uncaused causer—because there seems to be no part of the machinery that does
not follow in a causal relationship from the other parts.”23 He argues that
concepts of “blame” should be replaced with “science” and that
“[b]lameworthiness should be removed from the legal argot.”24
Blameworthiness is merely a “backward-looking concept that demands the
impossible task of untangling the hopelessly complex web of genetics and
environment that constructs the trajectory of a human life.”25
Eagleman’s near-mechanistic view of human nature is reflected in his bold
and ultimately frightening vision of the legal system. Since people do not
really possess moral agency, the question for the law is not whether the
accused is to blame for his or her conduct, but rather whether there is

18. Id. at 166.
19. Id.
20. ReasonTV, “You Are Your Brain”: David Eagleman on Transforming Criminal Justice,
YOUTUBE (June 14, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wSQY7zHk5y8.
21. Id. Of course, he did not explain how his views about biological determinism are
consistent with his description of first-person phenomenological qualia (“I’m afraid. . .” “I’m
pretty certain. . .”). And just moments before offering that grim response, he suggested that
biofeedback treatments for criminals would provide them with a “libertarian” way to “help
themselves.” Id.
22. David Eagleman, The Brain on Trial, THE ATLANTIC, July–Aug. 2011, at 112, 116.
23. Id. at 118.
24. Id. at 118, 120.
25. Id. at 120.
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something “different” about the person’s neurobiology that led the person to
act in a certain way.26 We should think about criminal conduct “in the same
way we think about any other physical process, such as diabetes or lung
disease.”27
Eagleman admits that, at present, only in relatively rare cases can we assert
with confidence that a person’s anti-social conduct was caused by an
identifiable brain condition, such as a tumor—but this, he claims, is merely a
problem of technology.28 In principle, he suggests, science will one day be able
to measure biological states with a degree of comprehensiveness and
granularity that will permit a full diagnosis of criminal conduct.29 Culpability,
he argues, should not “be determined by the limits of current technology.”30 In
place of traditional legal concepts of fault and blame, Eagleman proposes a
“forward-looking” system in which criminals would receive bio-feedback
treatments designed to retrain their brains towards “pro-social behavior.”31
How does Eagleman define what “pro-social” should mean in a world of
neurobiological determinism? He speaks of “social contracts,” “society’s
needs,” and what we can “hope for” as “a society that respects individual rights
and freedom of thought.”32 All of these concepts, of course, presuppose the
very “folk” concepts of freedom, autonomy, and intentionality that Eagleman’s
neuroscience supposedly deconstructs. Yet for Eagleman, these concepts are
merely artifacts of evolution.33 “A meaningful theory of human biology,” he
argues:
[C]annot be reduced to chemistry and physics, but instead must be understood
in its own vocabulary of evolution, competition, reward, desire, reputation,
avarice, friendship, trust, hunger, and so on—in the same way that traffic flow
will be understood not in the vocabulary of screws and spark plugs, but instead
in terms of speed limits, rush hours, road rage, and people wanting to get home
34
to their families as soon as possible when their workday is over.

Instead of assuming that people ordinarily possess a degree of agency that
allows them to choose whether to abide by the law, Eagleman argues that
“criminals should always be treated as incapable of having acted otherwise.”35
The role of the legal system would then shift from assigning blame based
on agency to changing the law-breaker’s brain state in order to produce more
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

EAGLEMAN, supra note 16, at 174–77.
Id. at 170.
Id. at 175–76.
Id. at 176.
Id.
Eagleman, supra note 22, at 120, 122.
Id. at 121–23.
EAGLEMAN, supra note 16, at 218–19.
Id.
Id. at 177.
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desirable behavior.36 This would be accomplished by a “prefrontal workout”
consisting of cognitive biofeedback.37 A person’s sentence—their prescribed
prefrontal workout regimen—would depend on the degree to which the
person’s biology is “modifiable,” based on some as-yet-undiscovered measure
of neuroplasticity.38 The concept of variable neuroplasticity is important,
Eagleman observes, because contrary to the ideals of developed democracies,
all people are not created equal: “While admirable in spirit, the notion of
neural equality is simply not true.”39 People vary widely both in nature and in
nurture.40 With this truth in hand, we could “tailor sentencing and
rehabilitation” to the individual’s specific neurobiological makeup.41
C. Paleoanthropology, Sociobiology, and the Human Mind
Since neuroLaw purports to be rooted in human evolutionary history, it
might be helpful to examine what, in evolutionary terms, it means to be
“human.” In fact, the term “human” is elastic in paleoanthropology.42
Moreover,
there
is
significant
disagreement
between
some
paleoanthropologists and some evolutionary sociobiologists about what, if
anything, makes modern humans unique.
1.

Paleoanthropological Narratives

Paleoanthropologists broadly agree that a “cultural explosion,” a “big bang
of human culture,” occurred around 60,000 to 30,000 years ago.43 As
36. Id. at 115.
37. Eagleman, supra note 22, at 122.
38. Id. at 123.
39. Id.
40. EAGLEMAN, supra note 16, at 187.
41. Eagleman, supra note 22, at 123.
42. Scientific convention is to refer to as “human” all hominid species dating back to the
split in evolutionary lineage from chimpanzees about four million years ago. See, e.g., G.J.
SAWYER AND VIKTOR DEAK, THE LAST HUMAN: A GUIDE TO TWENTY-TWO SPECIES OF
EXTINCT HUMANS (2007) (a fascinating and beautifully produced book, which offers
photographs of forensic reconstructions based on fossil samples of twenty-two species of
hominids dating back to over seven million years, as well as narratives of the possible lifeways of
these creatures). The basic outlines of human evolution are not in serious doubt. For a good
overview of the evidence for human evolution from a paleoanthropological perspective, see IAN
TATTERSALL, THE FOSSIL TRAIL: HOW WE KNOW WHAT WE THINK WE KNOW ABOUT HUMAN
EVOLUTION (1995). For a discussion of the genetic evidence for human evolution, see Genetic
Clues of Relatedness, THE CAMBRIDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN EVOLUTION 293 (Steve
Jones, Robert Martin & David Pilbeam eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1994). The essay accepts as
true the fossil and genetic evidence for human evolution, but questions the metaphysical
reductionism that underpins sociobiology and neuroLaw.
43. See STEVEN MITHEN, THE PREHISTORY OF THE MIND: THE COGNITIVE ORIGINS OF
ART, RELIGION AND SCIENCE 151 (1996). As with all things in paleoanthropology, there are
dissenters even from this widely held view.
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archaeologist Steven Mithen notes, “[W]ith no apparent change in brain size,
shape or anatomy in general—the cultural explosion occurred.”44 Similarly,
paleoanthropologist Ian Tattersall, who curated the American Museum of
History’s Hall of Human Origins, argues that modern humans “are an
altogether unprecedented presence on our planet.”45 Further, Tattersall says
that the notion that “the long human story” represents “an extended and
gradual struggle from primitiveness toward perfection” is simply false.46 “The
acquisition of the uniquely modern sensibility” reflected in the cultural
explosion, Tattersall says, “was instead an abrupt and recent event.”47
Tattersall believes that our hominid predecessors generally did not possess
the capacity for symbolic thought and had no robust sense of “self.”48 For
example, Tattersall describes Homo heidelbergensis, which lived between
600,000 and 200,000 years ago, as follows:
These were hardy, resourceful folk, who occupied and exploited a huge range
of habitats throughout the Old World through the deployment of an amazing
technological and cultural ingenuity. They were adroit hunters who pursued
large game using sophisticated techniques, built shelters, controlled fire,
understood the environments they inhabited with unprecedented subtlety, and
produced admirable stone tools that at least occasionally they mounted into
composite implements. Altogether, they lived more complex lives than any
49
hominids had ever done before them.

And yet, Tattersall observes, “[T]hroughout the period of Homo
heidelbergensis’s tenure no hominid produced anything, anywhere, that we can
be sure was a symbolic object.”50 He therefore concludes that:
If I had to wager a guess, it would be that the intelligence of these hominids,
formidable as it may have been, was purely intuitive and non-declarative. They
neither thought symbolically as we do, nor did they have language. As a result,
we can’t usefully think of them as a version of ourselves, certainly cognitively
51
speaking.

Although most paleoanthropologists agree that the fact of a “cultural
explosion” is well documented, they disagree on what caused it. Tattersall
suggests there are two leading theories: the theory of “mind” and the theory of
“language.”52 Tattersall himself falls into the “language” camp.53
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 15.
IAN TATTERSALL, MASTERS OF THE PLANET X (2012).
Id. at XI.
Id.
Id. at 67.
Id. at 142.
TATTERSALL, supra note 45, at 142.
Id. at 142–43.
Id. at 213–14.
Id. at 216.
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Tattersall acknowledges that “[t]he changeover of Homo sapiens from a
nonsymbolic, nonlinguistic species to a symbolic, linguistic one is the most
mind-boggling cognitive transformation that has ever happened to any
organism.”54 He finds the theory of language compelling because language
seems to bridge the “symbolic” and “intuitive” aspects of observed human
nature and because language is a “communal possession.”55 He takes these two
aspects of human nature—symbolic and intuitive—to correspond to reason and
emotion.56
Tattersall suggests that language first developed “in a small community of
biologically prepared early Homo sapiens somewhere in Africa,” perhaps first
among children stretching their minds through play, though he acknowledges
that “[t]he details of this transition will probably forever evade us.”57 Part of
this “biological preparation,” according to Tattersall, might have involved the
brain’s ability to make connections between higher areas—the cortex—
“without passing through the older emotional centers below.”58 One of the first
linguistic functions this might have facilitated, he suggests, was the ability to
name objects.59 Another possibility he finds plausible is a significant increase
in the brain’s capacity for working memory, which facilitates executive
functions such as “decision-making, goal forming, planning, and so on.”60 In
any event, he concludes, “[I]t seems likely that a random modification of the
already exapted brain, plus some children at play, led to the literal emergence
of a phenomenon that changed the world.”61
Steven Mithen, in contrast, is a prominent proponent of the “mind” school.
Mithen argues that the cultural explosion “resulted in such a fundamental
change in lifestyles that there can be little doubt that it derived from a major
change in the nature of the mind.”62 Mithen draws on evolutionary
psychologists who think of the “mind” not as a unified command center, but
rather as a set of specialized modules that gradually developed in response to
different environmental pressures.63 Instead of the common metaphor of a
“computer” for the mind, Mithen employs the metaphor of a “Swiss army
knife.”64 The key breakthrough for the cultural explosion, Mithen argues, must
have been a new way of connecting the diverse modules of the early human

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 220.
TATTERSALL, supra note 45, at 220–221.
Id. at 220.
Id.
Id. at 220, 222–23.
Id. at 222.
TATTERSALL, supra note 45, at 224.
Id. at 225.
MITHEN, supra note 43, at 15.
Id. at 13–14.
Id. at 14.
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mind so that they could communicate and coordinate with each other in new
ways.65 Here he employs a different metaphor: the human mind became a
“cathedral,” with different “rooms” that can function seamlessly together.66
Like a visitor to a cathedral who might walk from the nave to the chapel to the
altar, cognition could then flow across domains and make unified connections.
An early Paleolithic person might have known “rock” in one domain that
included making flake tools, “animal” in another domain that included
scavenging carcasses for food, and “female” in yet another domain that
included sex and reproduction—but these different cognitive modules might
not have communicated with each other.67 An Upper Paleolithic person, in
contrast, might have been able to make connections between “rock,” “animal,”
and “female” in ways that gave rise to the symbolic “Venus” figurines found in
the archeological record starting about 35,000 years ago, or the exquisite Lion
Man statuette from the Hohlenstein-Stadel Cave in Germany, dating to about
30,000 years ago.68
Both Mithen and Tattersall, however, seem to recoil from the implications
of their observations for any concept of transcendence, even as they exult in
the transcendent beauty of something like the Lion Man statuette. At the
conclusion of The Prehistory of the Mind, Mithen declares that “[t]he human
mind is a product of human evolution, not supernatural creation. I have laid
bare the evidence. I have specified the ‘whats’, the ‘whens’ and the ‘whys’ for
the evolution of the mind.”69 Mithen believes his explanations are complete
and airtight. He seems to have no room for a concept of “why” beyond the
biological, never mind a concept of causation that could encompass
“evolution” as part of an act of “creation.”
In a strange coda to his Masters of the Planet, Tattersall reflects on
universals and the bell curve.70 He observes that:
Yes, you can indeed find regularities in human behaviors, every one of them
doubtless limited by basic commonalities in the structure of our controlling
organs. But all such regularities are in reality statistical abstractions, and
people are absolutely uniform in none of them. As a result, if any statistical
phenomenon could be said to govern the human condition, it would be the
“normal distribution” or the “bell curve.” . . .
In any human characteristic you might care to specify, physical or
behavioral, you will find a bell curve. . . . For every saint, there is a sinner; for
71
every philanthropist, a thief; for every genius, an idiot.

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 151–53.
Id. at 151.
MITHEN, supra note 43, at 160.
Id. at 155, 162–63.
Id. at 215.
TATTERSALL, supra note 45, at 228–29.
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These variations, he suggests, mean there are no universal human
characteristics, but only variations along a curve.72 Indeed, he claims, “[A]part
from that basic ability we all share to re-create the world in the mind, perhaps
the only other true ‘human universal’ we all show is cognitive dissonance.”73
If Mithen and Tattersall’s reservations about transcendence are correct,
there can be no “law,” or at least no possibility of the “rule of law.” There may
be cognitive connections that facilitate language and the production of cultural
artifacts, but such signs must signify nothing beyond themselves. If there is
nothing signified, there may be cultural and linguistic structures that encourage
and enforce behaviors, but there cannot be “law.”
Yet Tattersall strikes a hopeful note at the end of his coda. Although
humans have polluted the planet—a fact about which Tattersall does not
hesitate to offer a negative value judgment rather than a placid observation
about the normal distribution—there is hope, because “our rational abilities
and our extravagant neophilia nonetheless remain beyond remarkable.”74
“From the very first stirrings of the human symbolic spirit,” Tattersall assures
us, “the technological and creative histories of humankind have revolved
around an energetic exploration of the innovative potential released by our new
way of processing information about the world.”75 Thus, “while the auguries
appear indeed to be for no significant biological change in our species,
culturally, the future is infinite.”76
How can Tattersall move from the confines of the normal distribution into
an infinite future in the course of a few paragraphs? How does he move from
rejecting all universals to “our rational abilities,” “our extravagant neophilia,”
“the human symbolic spirit,” the “technological and creative histories of
humankind,” and “our new way of processing information about the world”?77
He does not say.78 It seems that Mithen and Tattersall, as archaeologists and
anthropologists, cannot accept the implications of their own evidence against
reductive scientism. Purpose, meaning, and even beauty, joy, and hope keep
bubbling up from the primordial ooze.

71. Id.
72. Id. at 229.
73. Id. This is quite a jarring coda given Tattersall’s exuberant claim in the previous chapter
that human language, born in the play of children, represents a “communal possession” of
humanity. It seems that Tattersall must toss aside his prior 220 pages of argument and resign
himself to the fact that human existence can have no common meaning or purpose.
74. Id. at 232.
75. TATTERSALL, supra note 45, at 232.
76. Id.
77. Id. (emphasis added).
78. Id. Perhaps this is an example of the human universal of cognitive dissonance.
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Reductive Sociobiological Narratives

Reductive sociobiology demurs even from the cautiously optimistic stance
of paleoanthropologists concerning modern human uniqueness. For example,
David Sloan Wilson, distinguished Professor of Biological Sciences and
Anthropology at Binghamton University, argues that Darwinian evolution fully
explains everything, including every aspect of human nature.79 Anyone who
thinks otherwise, even “intellectuals” who are not religious, is a kind of
fundamentalist, an “‘academic creationist.’”80
Wilson is clear in his evangelistic program for his version of evolutionism.
“First,” he says, “we must abandon the notion that some special quality was
breathed into us by a higher power.”81 He claims that this does not demand an
outright rejection of religious faith because, he says, “[M]any people manage
to combine a vibrant religious faith with a fully naturalistic conception of the
world.”82 But whatever he means here by “religious faith,” there is no room in
that faith for anything but the physical world. Wilson’s epistemology is
uncompromising:
What goes for knowledge of the physical world also goes for knowledge
about ourselves. If something is wrong with your body, your mind, or society,
it has a naturalistic explanation, just like [a] problem with your car. Believing
that we have special god-given abilities is like praying to your car on the side
83
of the road.

Sloan Wilson is not content merely to reduce “religious faith” to nature. He
must include “culture” as well. “A common claim,” even among non-religious
people, he notes, “is that ‘biology’ sets broad limits to our behavior, such as
eating and procreation, but that ‘culture’ determines what we do within the
broad limits, such as making art rather than babies.”84 This high concept of
“culture,” he correctly observes, suggests that notwithstanding our
evolutionary past we are free to choose our future destiny.85
To this claim that “culture” exerts some kind of downward causality,
Wilson cries, “Hubris, all hubris!”86 Since whatever attributes make humans
unique are merely “like an addition onto a vast multiroom mansion” over deep

79. DAVID SLOAN WILSON, EVOLUTION FOR EVERYONE: HOW DARWIN’S THEORY CAN
CHANGE THE WAY WE THINK ABOUT OURSELVES 6 (2007).
80. Id. at 2–3 (quoting Barbara Ehrenreich and Janet McIntosh, The New Creationism:
Biology Under Attack, THE NATION, June 9, 1997, at 11). We may note in passing the irony of
dismissing as “fundamentalist” everyone who disagrees with Sloan’s Darwinian fundamentalism.
81. Id. at 68.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. WILSON, supra note 79, at 69.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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evolutionary time, “[i]t is sheer hubris to think that we can ignore all but the
newest room.”87 Indeed, Wilson claims that humans have regarded themselves
as “uniquely intelligent, moral, flexible, and capable of aesthetic appreciation,”
and that most of these are “self-congratulatory and suspect as factual claims.”88
He thinks it empirically established that “other species far surpass our
intelligence for specific tasks and that traits associated with goodness can
evolve in any species, given the right environmental conditions.”89
Nevertheless, Wilson admits that humans possess a unique capacity to
construct their own social environments, and indeed “evolutionary social
constructivism” is the core of his moral and political philosophy.90 The
essential problem for morality, religion, and politics, in Wilson’s scheme, is
that “[s]ome individuals are driven to benefit themselves at the expense of
others or their society as a whole.”91 To illustrate this problem, he surveys
various game-theoretic models of altruism.92
In a chapter titled “Love Thy Neighbor Microbe,” for example, he
describes a bacterial species, Pseudomonas flourescens, which creates a
polymer mat that sticks the bacteria together in a colony.93 The mat is
biologically expensive to create and eventually some mutant bacteria instead
devote energy to reproduction.94 When the mutants begin to thrive, the mat
collapses, and the colony disintegrates.95 “Thus,” Wilson observes, “is the glue
of civilization dissolved by sloth!”96 And such “examples of good and evil
among microbes can be repeated without end because they are based on
inescapable facts of social life.”97 All of this maps directly onto human
behavior and human folk concepts of “good” and “evil.”98 But, Wilson
concludes, “If the traits that we associate with goodness can evolve, then we
can make them more common by providing the right environmental conditions.
Far from denying the potential for change, evolutionary theory can provide a
detailed recipe for change.”99
87. Id. at 70.
88. Id. at 71.
89. WILSON, supra note 79, at 71.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 13.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 128–29.
94. WILSON, supra note 79, at 128–29.
95. Id. at 129.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. WILSON, supra note 79, at 32. Of course, what Sloan Wilson describes here has nothing
to do with classical notions of “good” and “evil,” which relate to intentional states, virtues, and
transcendentals. See, e.g., Rachana Kamtekar, Ancient Virtue Ethics: An Overview With an
Emphasis on Practical Wisdom, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO VIRTUE ETHICS 29, 42–46
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Similarly, Michael Graziano, Professor at Princeton University’s
Neuroscience Institute, denies any sense of the transcendent:
When we say we are conscious, aware, self-aware, in conscious control of
our actions, have a stream-of-consciousness understanding of ourselves, what
we really mean, apparently, is this: there is a system in the brain whose job is
to construct models of intentionality of other people or of ourselves; and right
or wrong, confabulated or not, the self-model, continuously updated,
100
continuously refined, supplies the contents of our conscious mind.

Since the author of this phenomenon is merely a system in the brain,
Graziano says, “In this sense consciousness—a soul on a trajectory through
waking life—is a perceptual illusion. It is a perceptual model that is at best a
simplification and sometimes plain wrong.”101 All intentionality is reducible,
for Graziano, to individual neurons.102 And what seems like the product of
self-reflexivity, awareness, and language—the sorts of cultural things Mithen
and Tattersall argue radically distinguish modern humans from all other

(Daniel C. Russell ed., 2013) (explaining that only virtue is good by nature and that virtue, as a
whole, is expertise in living); Jean Porter, Virtue Ethics in the Medieval Period, in THE
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO VIRTUE ETHICS 70, 83–87 (Daniel C. Russell ed., 2013) (explaining
that the classical view of diverse virtues are all expressions of some one virtue or ideal of
goodness, rationality, or charity). But Sloan Wilson has already made his a priori commitment to
absolute naturalism, so he has dismissed several thousand years of historical reflection on “good”
and “evil” tout court. Here we must remark on Sloan Wilson’s cry of “Hubris, all hubris!” (Yet
what is “hubris” in a naturalistic game-theoretic world without transcendent virtues?).
100. MICHAEL S.A. GRAZIANO, GOD SOUL MIND BRAIN: A NEUROSCIENTIST’S
REFLECTIONS ON THE SPIRIT WORLD 65 (2010).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 99–100. Memeology, of course, is one of the more absurdly imaginative inventions
of materialistic reductionism. For a good critique of memeology, see ALISTER MCGRATH,
DAWKINS’ GOD: GENES, MEMES, AND THE MEANING OF LIFE 7–8 (2005) (explaining that the
theory of memes offers a new theoretical framework for exploring the general question of the
origins, development, and reception of ideas). No one has ever observed a meme, nor by
definition can memes ever discretely be observed because they are cultural phenomena and not
encoded in biology like genes. Moreover, if memes can explain “belief after belief” in religion,
they can do the same in science. This would mean there can be no “science” of archeology or
paleontology that might offer insights into the development of human consciousness, awareness,
language, or culture because the idea of something like “archeology” or “paleontology” is just a
meme, as are any ideas of human consciousness, awareness, language, and culture. Memeology
itself must be merely a meme, as must the supposed explanatory power of Darwinian evolution.
Indeed, the very concept of “explanatory power” must be a meme, a “perceptual illusion” as
Graziano would say. But then there are no “illusions” because the notion of an “illusion,” which
presupposes a “reality,” is a meme also. Memes therefore cannot “explain” anything, for there are
no “explanations.” The universal acid consumes itself. See CONOR CUNNINGHAM, DARWIN’S
PIOUS IDEA 4–5 (2010) (discussing the transformative and all-consuming nature of Darwin’s
universal acid).
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creatures—are merely “memes” that cause certain neurons to fire.103 Thus,
there is no intentionality and no “law.”
II. A PHILOSOPHICAL GENEALOGY OF REDUCTIVE NEUROLAW
A.

Law, Means, and Ends

The drive to make the law “scientific” is not in the first instance the result
of any empirical observations of evolutionary biology or neuroscience. Rather,
it is rooted in the broader intellectual movement towards legal positivism and
instrumentalism. In his insightful book Law as a Means to an End, Brian
Tamanaha describes the shift in Anglo-American law towards legal
instrumentalism starting in the nineteenth century.104 Tamanaha traces how
“law” in the West became unmoored from any transcendent source and began
to occupy the place of a “science.” He explains that:
Science is oriented toward uncovering causal relations, effects and functions,
formulated in terms of principles or laws. Non-instrumental views portrayed
law as an immanent ordering (of the universe or of the community). Under a
scientific view, law would come instead to be seen as the source of social
order—to produce social order is the function or purpose or end of law. In turn,
this new perspective, over time, would open up questions about the efficiency
and utility of law in carrying out its functions. The subtle but fundamental
105
difference can be put thus: law is order, versus law maintains order."

Tamanaha notes that in the Anglo-American legal tradition, historically,
“law was not seen as an empty vessel that could be filled in with whatever
content might be desired by law makers to serve whatever end was desired.”106
There were various theories of legal legitimacy, including “natural law,
principle and reason, or customs from time immemorial,” all of which finally
located law in some transcendent source.107 But, according to Tamanaha, a
variety of intellectual currents, including Spencerian Social Darwinism, laisez
faire economics, and Benthamite utilitarianism, contributed to the rise of “legal
positivism” throughout the nineteenth century.108 Legal positivism is a form of
“command” theory of law, in which the law is simply whatever the authority
with the power to enforce it says it is.109 Legal positivism is readily twinned
with legal instrumentalism, which understands the law as a tool for achieving

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

GRAZIANO, supra note 100, at 150–58.
BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END 5 (2006).
Id. at 21.
Id. at 35.
Id.
Id. at 38–43.
TAMANAHA, supra note 104, at 43.
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ends that are essentially infinitely malleable.110 Thus the law becomes severed
from any transcendent source beyond the chosen instrumental ends instantiated
in the will of whoever has the power to enforce the law.
B.

Law, Power, and Will

Tamanaha’s genealogy of legal positivism is helpful, but in fact the roots
of the drive towards “scientific” law run deeper than the scientific revolution
and the Enlightenment. They reach deep into theological movements of the
late medieval scholastic period, particularly nominalism, voluntarism, and the
move towards a univocal understanding of God’s being.111
As historian Brad Gregory notes, “[T]he alleged incompatibility between
science and religion derives not from science but in the first instance from a
seemingly arcane metaphysical presupposition of some medieval scholastic
thinkers.”112 This metaphysical presupposition was that God shares being with
creation (a “univocity of being” between God and creation); that God’s will is
radically non-contingent, including on God’s essential nature or being; and that
God’s providence, including his governance of creation, because of its radical
non-contingency, was arbitrary.113

110. Id.
111. See, e.g., AMOS FUNKENSTEIN, THEOLOGY AND THE SCIENTIFIC IMAGINATION 57
(1986) (explaining that the Nominalists and Scholasticists of the fourteenth century objected to
any equivocation); MICHAEL ALLEN GILLESPIE, THE THEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF MODERNITY 35
(2008) (noting that modern science developed out of nominalism); BRAD S. GREGORY, THE
UNINTENDED REFORMATION: HOW A RELIGIOUS REVOLUTION SECULARIZED SOCIETY 32–73
(2012) (discussing how seventeenth-century contributions by developments in scholastic
philosophy led to the appropriation and transformation of metaphysical univocity by nominalist
thinkers).
112. GREGORY, supra note 111, at 33.
113. Id. at 33–37; GILLESPIE, supra note 111, at 23; Catherine Pickstock, Duns Scotus: His
Historical and Contemporary Significance, 21 MODERN THEOLOGY 543, 557–58 (2005). It
should be noted that this rather simple account of these medieval theologians, and particularly of
the thought and influence of Duns Scotus, has been hotly contested. See, e.g., John Hare, Scotus
on Morality and Nature, 9 MEDIEVAL PHIL. & THEOLOGY 15, 35–38 (2000) (delineating three
objections that eudaimonists have with Duns Scotus’s positions); Editors’ Introduction: John
Duns Scotus and Modern Theology, 21 MODERN THEOLOGY 539, 539–40 (2005) (introducing
Duns Scotus’s view of the univocal concept of being and the scholarly debate that follow);
Olivier Boulnois, Reading Duns Scotus: From History to Philosophy, 21 MODERN THEOLOGY
603, 604–05 (2005) (explaining the ways in which the author disagrees with Duns Scotus’s
philosophy). As Hare and others argue, it may be that Scotus used the language of univocity in
recognition of the limits of human language, while continuing to hold that God was ontologically
entirely transcendent of creation. See id. (noting God’s transcendence within human intelligence).
See also Thomas Williams, The Doctrine of Univocity is True and Salutary, 21 MODERN
THEOLOGY 575, 577, 582–83 (2005) (disagreeing with the charge that Duns Scotus’s doctrine of
univocity destroys the transcendent uniqueness of God); Nelson H. Minnich et al., Forum Essay,
in 98 CATHOLIC HISTORICAL REVIEW 503, 508 (2012) (comments of Joshua Benson reviewing
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If God’s will was arbitrary, then it could be known only by revelation and
not by reason, and likewise nature could only be known by empirical
investigation of natural phenomena and not by abstract reasoning about the
relations between transcendent universals and immanent particulars.114
Nominalist theologian William of Ockham (c. 1287–1347) is known today for
“Ockham’s Razor,” which is interpreted in contemporary discourse as a
general principle of parsimony in theorizing about natural phenomena.115
Ockham’s Razor, however, originally was directed at excessive speculation
about transcendent universals.116
If God’s being was univocal with the being of creation, the “need” for God
as a causal agent diminished.117 Because of the increasing loss of a sense of
God’s absolute transcendence over creation, prompted at least in part by
Scholastic nominalism and voluntarism, the physicist Pierre-Simon Laplace
(1749–1827) could eventually (reportedly) exclaim that he had no need of God
as a “hypothesis” in assessing natural causation.118 Further, Laplace argued
that nominalist scientific empiricism should be applied to law and politics:
“Let us apply to the political and moral sciences the method founded upon

BRAD S. GREGORY, THE UNINTENDED REFORMATION (2012)) (critiquing and briefly
summarizing Duns Scotus’s doctrine of univocity). Nevertheless, this sort of language had
consequences as it filtered through the Reformation and the Enlightenment. See id. at 513
(response of Brad S. Gregory). As Gregory argues:
Even if we follow those interpreters [of Scotus] who, as Benson indicates, regard Scotus’s
conception of being as a semantic theory of religious language rather than an ontology, it
would at most qualify the character of Scotus’s contribution . . . . A more adequate
account would then inquire about the process whereby Scotus’s semantic theory was
taken as a metaphysics such that God and creation were conceived ontological as (infinite
and finite) differentiations within the more encompassing reality of being . . . . For,
whatever the particularities of the history, it seems clear not only that this happened, but
also that, in combination with Occam’s razor applied to an either/or distinction between
natural and supernatural causality, it explains why so many scholars and scientists today
mistakenly assume that central claims of revealed religion are rendered implausible in
proportion as scientific explanation of natural regularities proceeds apace.
Id. at 513. For a balanced discussion of the role of Scotus in relation to Aristotelian/Thomistic
virtue ethics, see Porter, supra note 99, at 89 (explaining that Duns Scotus, unlike Aquinas, did
not believe that the soul is really distinct from its faculties. Further, unlike Aristotle, Duns Scotus
did not value the concept of virtue ethics as highly).
114. Gillespie, supra note 111, at 23.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. CARL B. BOYER, A HISTORY OF MATHEMATICS 494 (2d ed. 1991). In fact, this account
of Laplace’s comments might be apocryphal, but nevertheless it was widely repeated and became
part of the intellectual milieu in which “science” and “faith” came to be viewed as separate, and
competing, domains. See, e.g., FUNDAMENTALISMS AND SOCIETY 30 (Martin E. Marty & R. Scott
Appleby eds., 1997).
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observation and upon calculus, the method which has served us so well in the
natural sciences.”119
Political philosopher Jean Bethke Elshtain suggests that the rule of law was
ultimately weakened by these trends. In her Gifford lectures, Elshtain noted
how the nominalistic sense of will, power, justice, and law has informed
Western concepts of political sovereignty since the late Middle Ages:
If there is a vital move in theology, law, and ethics with nominalism, it is
this: An emphasis on the primacy of will over intellect is lodged as the
gravamen of understandings of power and authority—a seismic shift from
realist emphases. Within medieval realism, even as Jesus, the Mediator, help
us to “rise to him,” as Augustine puts it, so an enduring fabric and structure of
unchanging law forges a connection between God and human beings. Human
reason has access to it and can come to know and to embrace law freely. The
grounding of ethics lies in law. There is an element of predictability here: You
120
can “take it to the bank,” as we nowadays say.

Elshtain connects this nominalist tendency with legal positivism:
By contrast, the rise of a command-obedience account of law, what in
modernity came to be called legal positivism, turned, at least in its early
formulations, on the theory of a willful supreme being who might as well have
created things differently than he did—and might yet do so by undoing what
has been done. . . .
Remaining on the trail of the will in theology and politics—the voluntarist
tendency—earthly sovereignty is to social, political, and religious life as God’s
121
sovereignty is to the emergence of law and dominion in the first instance.

Here is the trace of Jacques Derrida’s argument about the founding event of
justice and law as always an act of violence.122 If the founding event of God’s
justice, the giving of the law in the Garden, is just an arbitrary act of will—a
rule that God could change at any moment—then the same can be said of the
human exercise of authority as derived from God. Elshtain notes:
In strong articulations of the voluntarist theory, God holds the potential power
in reserve—power as absoluta—and possesses the latent power to alter prior
revelations of divine law and natural law as reason-based in favor of an
alternative command structure. . . .

119. PIERRE SIMON & MARQUIS DE LAPLACE, A PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAY ON PROBABILITIES
107–08 (Frederick W. Truscott & Frederick L. Emory trans., 1902).
120. JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN, SOVEREIGNTY: GOD, STATE, AND SELF 50 (2008).
121. Id.
122. Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority,” 11 CARDOZO
L. REV. 920, 925–27 (1990).
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The “sovereign” or ruler, whether pontiff, emperor, or king, might be
understood to be above the law and not beholden to it lest he choose to be so
123
....

As God was elided from the equations of law and justice, first the absolute
human sovereign, and then autonomous self, and then the irrational self, and
finally the mercilessly deterministic brain began to take His place.
C. Law and the Bad Man
The voluntarist notion that law is reducible to power and will is reflected in
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.’s influential essay The Path of the Law,
delivered at the opening of a new Boston University Law School hall and
published in the Harvard Law Review in 1897.124 Holmes’s essay is so
important that it occupies the opening slot in David Kennedy and William
Fisher’s compilation of The Canon of American Legal Thought.125
Holmes opens his essay with the claim that “[w]hen we study law we are
not studying a mystery but a well known profession.”126 From the study of
precedent—the “oracles of the law”—Holmes argued, the law student can
discern the nature of legal duties.127 A legal duty is not a moral idea, but rather
“is nothing but a prediction that if a man does or omits certain things he will be

123. ELSHTAIN, supra note 120, at 50–51. But see HEIKO AUGUSTINUS OBERMAN, THE
HARVEST OF MEDIEVAL THEOLOGY 96–98 (The Labyrinth Press 3d ed. 1983). Oberman notes
that, in the voluntarist thought of Ockham’s disciple, Gabriel Biel, “God does not will something
because it is good or right. If this were the case, God’s will would be subject to created principles
of morality, whereas Biel is convinced that nothing can be called good unless it be accepted as
such by the ‘uncreated principle,’ God.” Id. at 96. Moreover, for Biel, “God can do something
which he himself has declared unjust; however, if he does it, it then becomes right; therefore the
will of God is the first rule of all justice.” Id. Nevertheless, Oberman notes that Biel did not
radically separate God’s will from God’s being, but rather that Biel attempted to preserve divine
simplicity by rejecting distinctions between God’s will and being. Id. at 99. In so doing, Oberman
argues, Biel preserved a notion of natural law as a stable, universal principle, albeit in a form
somewhat different from Thomas Aquinas, particularly in the possibility that God might
temporarily suspend some of His commandments. Id. at 110. Nevertheless, for Biel, “Insofar as
the wisdom of God which is involved in the establishment of the natural law is beyond human
intellectual capacities, it would have been possible for God to have decided in favor of a natural
law different from the present one.” Id. at 100. The present natural law exists de facto because
God has in His inscrutable wisdom made it so. Id. This seems to introduce an uncomfortable
possible division between God’s being and His will. Brad Gregory suggests that Oberman’s
assessment of nominalism is excessively sanguine because of Oberman’s personal disdain for
Thomism. GREGORY, supra note 111, at 401 n.30.
124. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 457 (1897).
125. THE CANON OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT (David Kennedy & William W. Fisher III
eds., 2006).
126. Holmes, supra note 124.
127. Id. at 457–58.
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made to suffer in this or that way by judgment of the court.”128 The law exists
to deter the “bad man,” for “[a] man who cares nothing for an ethical rule
which is believed and practised by his neighbors is likely nevertheless to care a
good deal to avoid being made to pay money, and will want to keep out of jail
if he can.”129 Therefore, Holmes told the newly matriculated Boston University
law students:
If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man,
who cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge enables
him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons for conduct, whether
130
inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience.

The law in esse, for Holmes, had nothing to do with morality. Indeed, only
“confusion of thought” could result from any equation of law and morality.131
Instead, Holmes wondered aloud “whether it would not be a gain if every word
of moral significance could be banished from the law altogether, and other
words adopted which should convey legal ideas uncolored by anything outside
the law.”132 If this were possible, Holmes mused, judges might better
understand their role as social engineers.133 Indeed, Holmes looked “forward to
a time when the part played by history in the explanation of [legal] dogma
shall be very small, and instead of ingenious research we shall spend our
energy on a study of the ends sought to be attained and the reasons for desiring
them.”134
A key “step towards that ideal” for Holmes was “that every lawyer ought
to seek an understanding of economics.”135 Holmes concluded his germinal
essay with a nod to the form of practical reason that underwrote his
philosophy: “Read the works of the great German jurists,” Holmes advised,
“and see how much more the world is governed to-day by Kant than by
Bonaparte.”136 There were no choices for Holmes other than the seemingly
opposite poles of rational freedom and dictatorial tyranny.
There is a profound irony here that seems to escape neuroLaw scholars
such as David Eagleman. Justice Holmes wrote the infamous U.S. Supreme
Court opinion in Buck v. Bell, a 1927 case that upheld the forced sterilization
of mentally retarded persons.137 In that case, Holmes wrote that:
128. Id. at 458.
129. Id. at 459.
130. Id. at 459.
131. Holmes, supra note 124, at 460.
132. Id. at 464.
133. See id. at 467–68 (stating, “I think that the judges themselves have failed adequately to
recognize their duty of weighing considerations of social advantage.”).
134. Id. at 474.
135. Id.
136. Holmes, supra note 124, at 478.
137. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 204 (1927).
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We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon the best
citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call upon those who
already sap the strength of the State for these lesser sacrifices, often not felt to
be such by those concerned, in order to prevent our being swamped with
incompetence. It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute
degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility,
society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind.
The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover
138
cutting the Fallopian tubes.

The climactic line of Holmes’s opinion in Buck v. Bell is widely regarded as
one of the most embarrassing in the history of U.S. Supreme Court
jurisprudence: “Three generations of imbeciles are enough.”139
D. From the Bad Man to Homo Economicus to Homo Irrationaliblis
In the contemporary history of American legal thought, this conjoining of
legal positivism and legal instrumentalism has tended to break into two
sometimes contradictory streams: the law and economics movement and
critical legal studies (CLS).140 Law and economics seeks to explain legal rules
in terms of microeconomic principles.141 CLS seeks to explain legal rules by
deconstructing the power relations behind the rules.142 CLS can be critical,
indeed hostile, to law and economics, but in some ways they are natural
bedfellows. It is law and economics, after all, that supplies the notion of
“capture,” which shows how most regulatory requirements result from the
influence of power industries that influence (“capture”) the regulators.143
But law and economics, following Holmes’s Kantian bent, purports to
offer a “scientific” analysis of legal rules that can supply an objective basis for
policymaking.144 Perhaps for this reason, over the past twenty-five years or so,
law and economics has been a reigning paradigm for legal scholarship, while
CLS has declined except among pockets of diehard adherents (often among
dispossessed groups such as racial minorities, women, and the LGBT
community).145 To be sure, there are other very important paradigms in the
legal academy that eschew the positivism behind both law and economics and

138. Id. at 207.
139. Id.
140. THE CANON OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, supra note 125, at 7; Peter Fitzpatrick &
Alan Hunt, Critical Legal Studies: Introduction, 14 J. LAW & SOC’Y. 1, 1–2 (1987).
141. THE CANON OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, supra note 125, at 7.
142. Fitzpatrick & Hunt, supra note 140, at 1.
143. William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Regulatory Competition, Regulatory
Capture, and Corporate Self-Regulation, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1861, 1863, 1875–76 (1995).
144. JAMES R. HACKNEY, JR., UNDER COVER OF SCIENCE: AMERICAN LEGAL-ECONOMIC
THEORY AND THE QUEST FOR OBJECTIVITY xiii (2006).
145. Id. at 155.
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CLS, notably deontological approaches informed in one way or another by
John Rawls.146 Nevertheless, law and economics continues to represent a
default “scientific” posture for many legal scholars.147
In recent years, however, the law and economics movement has witnessed
a significant shift occasioned by the rise of behavioral economics.148 Classical
microeconomics assumes rational utility-maximizing actors who act on perfect
information, a model which even neoclassical economists admit almost never
obtains in the real world.149 Behavioral economics, in contrast, assumes that
people do things for reasons that are often irrational or sub-rational.150 This
assumption is informed by empirical behavioral psychology studies.151 And

146. It is beyond the scope of this Article to offer a critique of Rawlsian legal theory. In short,
Rawlsians cannot articulate a reason why anyone ought to honor the original position and the veil
of ignorance, if cutting the veil and betraying the original position would make an individual
actor better off. A defender of Rawls might argue that the original position ought to be honored
because it protects the rights of all citizens and thereby promotes the aggregate well-being of
everyone. This sounds, however, like a utilitarian argument and not a deontological one.
Utilitarian arguments fail for the same reason: why ought any individual actor care about
aggregate social welfare? Who says maximizing aggregate social welfare is “good” if reaching
that goal decreases individual welfare for some? The question of what comprises “the good” is
begged.
147. TAMANAHA, supra note 104, at 120. Kennedy and Fisher divide American legal thought
into eight schools: “Legal Realism, Legal Process, Law and Economics, Law and Society,
Critical Legal Studies, Modern Liberalism, Feminist Legal Thought, and Critical Race Theory.”
THE CANON OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, supra note 125, at 7. Law and Economics and Law
and Society, however, are in fact both branches of Legal Realism, with Law and Society
representing sociology and other social sciences apart from economics. TAMANAHA, supra note
104, at 123. Likewise, Feminist Legal Thought and Critical Race Theory are branches of Critical
Legal Studies. Id. at 122. Legal Process and Modern Liberalism represent the pragmatist and
Rawlsian influences.
148. See, e.g., Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN.
L. REV. 1471, 1473 (1998); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral
Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption From Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV.
1051, 1053 (2000); Russell Korobkin, What Comes After Victory for Behavioral Law and
Economics?, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1653 (2011) (stating that “[t]he battle to separate the economic
analysis of legal rules and institutions from the straightjacket of strict rational choice assumptions
has been won by the proponents of ‘behavioral law and economics.’”).
149. Jolls et al., supra note 148, at 1476; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 148, at 1055.
150. See Jolls et al., supra note 148, at 1471 (stating that “[e]conomic analysis of law usually
proceeds under the assumptions of neoclassical economics. But empirical evidence gives much
reason to doubt these assumptions; people exhibit bounded rationality, bounded self-interest, and
bounded willpower.”).
151. See id. at 1489 (discussing how empirically verified patterns of behavior can be used to
generate new predictions); see also Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Behavioral Law
and Economics: Its Origins, Fatal Flaws, and Implications for Liberty, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1033,
1034 (2012) (noting that “[e]merging close on the heels of behavioral economics over the past
thirty years has been the ‘behavioral law and economics’ movement, which explores the legal and
policy implications of cognitive biases.”).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2014]

THE PROBLEM WITH NEUROLAW

519

behavioral economics has spawned a robust new sub-discipline of behavioral
law and economics.152
Behavioral law and economics scholarship can offer useful and interesting
insights concerning the limitations of rational choice theory for legal
analysis.153 Critics have argued, however, that the experiments upon which
behavioral economics is based are not transposable to real-world market
situations.154 Here reductive neuroLaw enters the stage. The supposedly harder
science of neurobiology—“harder” precisely because it is a natural science
rather than a social science—might confirm the behavioral economists’ insight
that human beings are finally not rational beings. Could neuroLaw finally
fulfill Holmes’s Kantian dream?
III. DECONSTRUCTING REDUCTIVE NEUROLAW
A.

The Naked Power of Law Without Reasons

If neuroLaw is truly to fulfill its promise, why doesn’t an ardent believer
such as David Eagleman go all-in for lobotomies, chemical castrations, and
other more direct biological interventions? “The ethical problem,” Eagleman
suggests, “pivots on how much a state should be able to change its citizens.”155
This is a “landmark problem” in neuroscience: “[A]s we come to understand
the brain, how can we keep governments from meddling with it?”156 One of
Eagleman’s concerns is that legal advances of recent years, such as civil rights
legislation, should not be compromised: “Our social policies work to cement
into place the most enlightened ideas of humanity to surmount the basest facets
of human nature.”157
Eagleman never explains what terms like “should” or “meddling” or
“enlightened” or “surmount” or “basest facets” might mean in his neuro-world.
Nor does he venture any suggestion about why some behaviors should qualify
for a prefrontal workout while others ought to be left unchecked or
encouraged. In a world without transcendence, why should one organism’s
immanent frame be preferred over another’s? Eagleman recites notorious
examples of pedophiles and mass murderers whose conduct clearly was
influenced by significant brain traumas or invasive tumors.158 What makes
152. See Jolls, et al., supra note 148, at 1489 (stating that behavioral economic analysis is a
promising new avenue for approaching legal questions).
153. See Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 151, at 1034 (discussing behavioral economics as a
significant development that combines economics and psychology to analyze departures from
rational choice behavior).
154. Id. at 1044–52.
155. EAGLEMAN, supra note 16, at 181–82.
156. Id. at 182.
157. Id. at 186.
158. Id. at 154–82.
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their brain states or their conduct abnormal and therefore subject to correction?
Why ought “governments” not possess the power to meddle with citizens’
brain states? In an evolving sociobiological matrix, there are no “neural rights”
(a term Eagleman inexplicably introduces and then drops);159 there are only
game-theoretic solutions for passing along genes.
To move from extreme examples such as pedophiles and mass murderers,
consider a society in which people who hold undesirable ideas and engage in
other anti-social practices—say, rallies and demonstrations for political or
religious causes opposed by the majority of the populace—are sent to
reeducation camps for prefrontal workouts. To refine the example, let us admit
that people are not in fact created equal, and that the task of determining which
rallies and demonstrations are anti-social is taken on by an elite class specially
bred for this task. Visions of Aryan supremacy, Communist China during the
Cultural Revolution, contemporary North Korea, and Orwell’s “1984” are not
far off. These are not new ideas, dressed up though they may be in the trendy
lingo of neuroscience.
Eagleman, to be fair, is not advocating a neuroscientific totalitarian state,
but there appears to be no reason why not. There simply is no basis in
neuroscience for his expressed preference of liberal democratic values or for
any other notion of human dignity inscribed in the law. Having given up on a
meaningful notion of persons and agency, he destroys the basis for
understanding “human equality” as something that transcends differences in
mental capacity.
Indeed, Eagleman at times seems uncomfortable with his own logic. In an
effort to critique any concept of an immaterial soul—which he refers to as “the
extrabiological soul”—he rehearses various examples of how brain states,
chemical alterations (such as cocaine) and brain injuries can affect behavior,
and concludes that “invisibly small molecules we call narcotics,
neurotransmitters, hormones, viruses, and genes can place their little hands on
the steering wheel of our behavior.”160 Quoting neuroethicist Martha Farah, he
asks:
[I]f an antidepressant pill ‘can help us take everyday problems in stride, and if
a stimulant can help us meet our deadlines and keep our commitments at work,
then must not unflappable temperaments and conscientious characters also be
features of people’s bodies? And if so, is there anything about people that is
161
not a feature of their bodies?’

159. Id. at 181.
160. EAGLEMAN, supra note 16, at 208–09.
161. Id. at 209 (quoting Martha J. Farah, Neuroethics: The Practical and the Philosophical, 9
TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCIENCES, 34, 38 (2005)).
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“If there’s something like a soul,” Eagleman says, “it is at minimum
tangled irreversibly with the microscopic details.”162 “From this point of
view,” he notes, “you can see why biological reductionism has a strong
foothold in modern brain science.”163
But then, remarkably, Eagleman undermines his entire thesis with a
critique of reductionism based on emergence.164 Reductionism, he says, “isn’t
the whole story.”165 He critiques the sort of genetic reductionism that drove the
Human Genome Project and concludes that “successive levels of reduction are
doomed to tell us very little about the questions important to humans.”166 He
nods towards systems biology by noting that “the contributions from the
genome can really be understood only in the context of interaction with the
environment” and argues that “knowledge of the genes alone is not sufficient
to tell you much about behavior.”167 He offers the example of reducing an
airplane to a hunk of metal, and concludes that “[t]he concept of emergent
properties means that something new can be introduced that is not inherent in
any of the parts.”168
So much for the way Eagleman initially framed the “crux of the question”
concerning law and responsibility: he apparently agrees that there can be a
meaningful concept of will and responsibility that need not propose a mind
“independent of the biology.”169 Indeed, he agrees that will and responsibility
need not even emerge from the brain alone: “Without a doubt,” he says,
“minds and biology are connected—but not in a manner that we’ll have any
hope of understanding with a purely reductionist approach.”170 And later he
concludes “[w]hen we talk about ‘the brain’ and behavior, this is a shorthand
label for something that includes contributions from a much broader
sociobiological system. The brain is not so much the seat of the mind as the
hub of the mind.”171After this statement, it is hard to comprehend what all the
fuss is about. It seems, then, that Eagleman wants it both ways: he wants
neuroscience to replace notions of agency and culpability, but at the same time

162. EAGLEMAN, supra note 16, at 209.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 217.
165. Id. at 209.
166. Id. at 210.
167. EAGLEMAN, supra note 16, at 211–12.
168. Id. at 217.
169. See id. at 162, 166 (“The crux of the question is whether all of your actions are
fundamentally on autopilot or whether there is some little bit that is ‘free’ to choose, independent
of the rules of biology.”).
170. Id. at 216.
171. Id. at 219.
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he wants to speak holistically of things like “desire,” “friendship,” “trust,”
“people,” and “families.”172
In fact, Eagleman’s approach is question-begging on multiple fronts. First,
Eagleman assumes that any part of the brain that is “free” to choose must
comprise a “little bit.”173 But what is meant by “little”? Throughout his book,
Eagleman gives examples that suggest the brain is comprised of multiple
independent control systems that operate below conscious awareness.174 He
argues that what we call “consciousness” is a sort of executive control module
that becomes active when circumstances require mediation between the
subconscious control systems—a situation that, in quantitative terms,
represents a small portion of our overall brain function.175 It appears, then, that
Eagleman’s term “little bit” is quantitative: only a small portion of our waking
brain activity may be dedicated to conscious decision-making.176 This may be
true, but Eagleman simply begs the question whether the qualitative aspects of
the activity he assigns to conscious decision-making are a “big bit” of what we
mean by “consciousness” and “responsibility.”
The realization that human beings conduct many of their daily activities in
an automatic or subconscious mode is not a new insight of neuroscience.
Eagleman averts to this when he acknowledges that “[t]he existence of free
will in human behavior is the subject of an ancient and heated debate.”177
Indeed! Yet he never even attempts to explore the contours of that debate. A
key problem in that debate is the phenomenological observation, known from
ancient times, that human beings often act automatically, under apparent
mental compulsion, or otherwise outside the zone of conscious control.178
What contemporary neuroscience brings to the table is a deeper understanding
of the physical element of at least some of these phenomena.
In fact, such a focus on habits and practices is precisely what virtue theory,
which informs many kinds of moral theology, is all about.179 Moral theologians
and philosophers, however, will want to inquire about the development of the
habit itself.180 Is not the “largest bit” of the story, from a qualitative

172. See EAGLEMAN, supra note 16, at 218–19 (explaining that the theory of biology cannot
be reduced to chemistry and physics but must be understood in its own vocabulary, which
includes, among other things, desire, friendship, trust, people, and families).
173. See id. at 166.
174. See id. at 171 (using examples of individuals who suffer from various mental/brain
disorders and defects).
175. Id. at 193–94.
176. Id. at 200.
177. EAGLEMAN, supra note 16, at 162.
178. Id. at 170.
179. See, e.g., Porter, supra note 99, at 77.
180. See, e.g., WILLIAM C. MATTISON III, INTRODUCING MORAL THEOLOGY: TRUE
HAPPINESS AND THE VIRTUES 59–60 (2008).
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perspective, the initial development of habits and practices, through some
exercise of the conscious will, that lead to habituated action? Far from
undermining traditional accounts of moral action, then, neuroscience simply
fleshes out the physical picture of what theology and philosophy already knew:
behaviors become ingrained in the “soul” and changing them requires
prolonged and sometimes difficult habituation into new behaviors.
B.

Evolving Norms and Fitness Landscapes

Eagleman’s proposal also suffers from a lack of normative grounding. In
an evolving universe, taken solely on its own terms, there is no normative force
to the term “normal.” There are populations, which always exhibit some degree
of genetic diversity, and there is change over time. There is no sense in which
organisms should conform to any “norm” external to survival in the context of
the selective pressures on the organism. Perhaps a rough analogy to a “norm”
would be a species’s fitness landscape—that is, the parameters of the
environment the species inhabits.181 The notion is that natural selection will
direct a population toward the mean fitness level as determined by the
organism’s environment.182
Let us return to Ian Tattersall’s reference to the normal distribution. We
could imagine a statistical normal distribution in which the mean fitness level
represents what Eagleman means by “normal” behavior. This is a great leap of
imagination given the complexity of human behavioral interactions (can “a
behavior” even be isolated from other behaviors?), but nevertheless we shall
simplify for the sake of discussion. In a normal distribution, more than twentyfive percent of the set falls between one and two standard deviations from the
mean, as illustrated below:183

181. See MARK RIDLEY, EVOLUTION 216 (3d ed. 2004) (“When the environment changed,
and competing species evolved new forms, the shape of the adaptive topography for a population
would change too.”).
182. See id. (explaining that natural selection causes organisms to adapt to their local
environment, which prevents some populations from evolving the best adaptations).
183. Standard Deviation Diagram, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Standard_de
viation_diagram.svg (last visited Sept. 26, 2013).
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Would Eagleman propose that twenty-five percent of the population be
assigned to reeducation camps for prefrontal workouts? In the United States,
this would encompass about seventy-nine million people.184 According to the
U.S. Census Bureau, over 1.6 million people were incarcerated in State and
Federal prisons in the United States as of 2009.185 Extending Eagleman’s
cognitive workout program to people beyond one standard deviation of the
mean therefore would represent a massive expansion of the criminal justice
system, without precedent in world history. Or, perhaps, Eagleman would
require cognitive workouts for only the roughly two percent who fall on the
tails outside two standard deviations of the mean? This would cover about 6.8
million people in the United States—about six times the number now
incarcerated.186 Who would decide where to draw this line? Do the sixty-eight
percent within one standard deviation of the mean get to decide, or the ninetyfive percent within two standard deviations?
A significant problem here—which is also a problem with Tattersall’s
reference to the normal distribution—is that, in strictly evolutionary terms,
particularly in terms of the concept of fitness landscapes, it is doubtful whether
there is any such thing as a homogenous normal distribution.187 Biologists who
favor the idea of fitness landscapes distinguish between “global” and “local”
landscapes, and argue that segments of a broader population can move toward
a fitness mean dictated by local niche conditions, which might represent a
different mean than that of the aggregate population.188 The resulting picture is
more like a set of hills and valleys rather than a single normal distribution:189

184. See U.S. and World Population Clock, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/popclock/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2013).
185. Table 347, Prisoners Under Jurisdiction of Federal or State Correctional Authorities—
Summary by State: 1990 to 2009, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/com
pendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0347.pdf (last visited Sept. 26, 2013).
186. See id. (There were over one and a half million prisoners under the jurisdiction of
Federal or State Correctional Authorities in 2009).
187. See RIDLEY, supra note 181, at 217–18 (discussing the debate within evolutionary
biology about the idea of local fitness landscapes).
188. See id. at 217 (explaining natural selection’s strong tendency to cause organisms to adapt
to their local environment).
189. See Fitness Landscape Cartoon, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Fitnesslandscape-cartoon.png (last visited Sept. 26, 2013) (Points A and C in this diagram are local
optimal fitness peaks).
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So what might the fitness landscape look like for human social behaviors?
Would there be local populations in which optimal behaviors include things
like forced marriage of young girls, slavery, and spousal abuse? It seems there
would be, or else such behaviors would not recur so often throughout human
history. Within such populations, presumably there would be no need for
cognitive workouts to correct such behavior. If anything, people who fall a
standard deviation or two outside this local mean (such as, perhaps, some
brave young woman who desired independence and an education) would be
candidates for reeducation. Curiously, this might indeed describe the
socialization process for young girls in some contemporary societies that blend
tribalism with radical Islamism (the Taliban).
Biologist and new atheist popularizer Sam Harris tackled precisely the
problem of the treatment of women in radical Islamist societies in an audacious
TED talk, entitled “Science Can Answer Moral Questions.”190 Early in his talk,
consistent with Eagleman, Harris claims that “a suicide bomber’s ‘personality
. . . is the product of his brain.”191 Yet, later, he flashes a picture of a woman
wearing a burqa and claims that everyone in his audience knows it is unhealthy
and bad for this woman to be forced to wear a burqa “involuntarily.’”192 But is
the woman’s choice to wear the burqa, or her compliance with the social norm
that impels her to wear the burqa, not a product of her brain? And does the
tradition of burqa-wearing not reflect something about social strategies in the
fitness landscape of Islamic societies, with deep historical roots in the cultural
dress practices of the ancient near east? Why should Harris’s historically recent
Western liberal democratic values trump the survival strategies of the near
eastern societies in which the burqa is valued?
Still later in his talk, Harris critiques the culture of girlie magazines in the
West.193 He asks, “Is this the optimal environment in which to raise our
children?”194 Well, who is to say? If the women who pose get paid, and the
190. Sam Harris, Science Can Answer Moral Questions, TED.COM, http://www.ted.com/talks/
lang/en/sam_harris_science_can_show_what_s_right.html (last visited Sept 26, 2013). TED
stands for “Technology, Entertainment, Design.” About TED, TED.COM, http://www.ted.com/
pages/about (last visited Sept. 26, 2013). Videos of “TED Talks” are freely available on the
internet and have become a cultural phenomenon. See 1500+ Talks to Stir your Curiosity,
TED.COM, http://www.ted.com/talks (last visited Sept. 26, 2013). Harris’s talk is based on his
New York Times bestseller, THE MORAL LANDSCAPE: HOW SCIENCE CAN DETERMINE HUMAN
VALUES (2010).
191. Harris, supra note 190, at 4:25–4:36.
192. Id. at 10:15–11:25.
193. Id. at 12:10–12:40.
194. Id. at 12:35–12:39. Most fascinating was the crowd’s reaction at this point in Harris’
talk—a hearty cheer against the commodification of women’s bodies! The enlightened
bourgeoisie who attend TED talks are of course all for raising girls who grow up to understand
that their bodies are not the property of the sort of men who buy girlie magazines—except,
perhaps, when a feminist tells them that pornography empowers women. See NADINE STROSSEN,
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men who peek get off, and the publishers and writers and newsstand owners
make money, are we not observing an optimal fitness maximization strategy?
The production and use of sexualized female imagery is among the most
ancient of human arts, which suggests from an ecological anthropology
perspective that such behavior serves some adaptive purpose.195
IV. A KINDER, GENTLER NEUROLAW?
A.

Hominization and the Law

The history of human evolution in the supposed state of pure nature,
unfortunately for the project of reductive neuroLaw, is deeply ambiguous.
Purely immanent “law” turns out either to affirm every behavior or to draw
entirely arbitrary lines among behaviors. Perhaps for this reason, it seems that
a transcendent concept of “law” is a human universal. Every human culture in
recorded history has some concept of transcendent principles that were
translated into some concept of justice and positive law.196 It seems that we are
homo juridicus—we cannot help but express particular legal norms for our
communal relations based on some higher governing principles. And the
capacity to formulate “law” seems uniquely human. David Sloan Wilson’s
microbes have no law, nor do chimps or dolphins formulate codes of positive
law or conceive (as far as we know) of a higher law, nor do we have any
record of law codes among any of the hominid species that preceded us.
The reference to “recorded history” in relation to law is important because
positive law, by definition, implies a record.197 The oldest law code discovered
by archaeologists is that of Ur-Nammu, ruler of the city of Ur during its third

DEFENDING PORNOGRAPHY: FREE SPEECH, SEX, AND THE FIGHT FOR WOMEN’S RIGHTS 146,
149, 151 (2000) (explaining that pornography and sexual imagery has empowered women rather
than degrade them). But see, e.g., CATHARINE MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 15–16, 20–22 (1993)
(explaining that many feminists believe pornography exploits women).
195. See, e.g., O. Soffer, J.M. Adovasio & D.C. Hyland, The “Venus” Figurines: Textiles,
Basketry, Gender, and Status in the Upper Paleolithic, 41 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 511, 511,
514 (2000). In fact, the applicability of fitness landscapes and other ecological concepts to human
cultural change is a contested question in the discipline of anthropology. See William S. Abruzzi,
Ecological Theory and the Evolution of Complex Human Communities, in 5 ADVANCES IN
HUMAN ECOLOGY 111, 115 (Lee Freese ed., 1996) (noting that “[c]onsiderable controversy
surrounds the application of ecological concepts in anthropological human ecology.”); Maria
Panakhyo & Stacy McGrath, Anthropological Theories: A Guide Prepared by Students for
Students, UNIV. OF ALA., http://anthropology.ua.edu/cultures/cultures.php?culture=Ecological
%20Anthropology (last visited Sept. 26, 2013) (not surprisingly, an early pioneer of what has
become the school of ecological anthropology was Thomas Malthus).
196. See, e.g., DAVID JOHNSTON, A BRIEF HISTORY OF JUSTICE 21, 37 (2011); C.S. LEWIS,
THE ABOLITION OF MAN 48 (2010).
197. See JAMES BERNARD MURPHY, THE PHILOSOPHY OF POSITIVE LAW: FOUNDATIONS OF
JURISPRUDENCE 1–3 (2005) (discussing sources of positive law).
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dynasty, which began in about 2050 B.C.198 The tablet containing UrNammu’s laws dates to about three hundred years before Hammurabi created
the code that was inscribed on a famous stele now on display in the Louvre.199
One side of the tablet containing Ur-Nammu’s law code locates the origin
of the laws in a creation myth.200 The chief gods An and Enlil appointed the
moon-god Nanna to rule over Ur, and Nanna in turn selected Ur-Nammu as
their human representative.201 Ur-Nammu removed the “chiselers” and
“grabbers,” people who stole the citizen’s oxen, sheep, and donkeys, from the
city.202 He established a system of weights and measures and ensured equity
for the poor and dispossessed.203 By his rule he ensured that “the orphan did
not fall a prey to the wealthy,” “the widow did not fall a prey to the powerful,”
and “the man of one shekel did not fall a prey to the man of one mina (sixty
shekels).”204
The other side of the tablet lists Ur-Nammu’s laws. The tablet is badly
damaged and only five of the laws are readily discernible.205 These show that
the lex talonis already had been mitigated through a system of monetary
payments. Thus, if a man cut off another man’s foot with some sort of
instrument (the text is unclear about what kind of instrument), he was liable for
damages of ten silver shekels; a severed nose required damages of two thirds
of a silver mina (forty silver shekels).206
Ur-Nammu certainly was not the first law-giver. Indeed, there are
references dating about three-hundred years before the Ur-Nammu law tablet
to the legal reforms of Urukagina, ruler of the city of Lagash.207 According to
an inscription memorializing Urukagina, he “freed the inhabitants of Lagash
from usury, burdensome controls, hunger, theft, murder, and seizure (of their
property and persons). He established freedom (of a type). The widow and
orphan were no longer at the mercy of the powerful: it was for them that
Urukagina made his covenant with Ningirsu.”208 All of these references show
that concepts of justice, the rule of law, and written law codes date at least to

198. SAMUEL NOAH KRAMER, HISTORY BEGINS AT SUMER 52 (3d rev. ed. 1981).
199. Id. at 51; see also Law Code of Hammurabi, King of Babylon, LOUVRE, http://www.lou
vre.fr/en/oeuvre-notices/law-code-hammurabi-king-babylon (last visited Sept. 26, 2013)
(photograph and discussion of the Hammurabi stele).
200. KRAMER, supra note 198, at 53–54.
201. Id. at 54.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. KRAMER, supra note 198, at 54.
206. Id. at 55.
207. Id. at 45–46, 49–50.
208. The Reforms of Urukagina, INT’L WORLD HIST. PROJECT, http://history-world.org/re
forms_of_urukagina.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2013).
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the foundations of the earliest Mesopotamian cities. Perhaps the inscribing of
positive law is as old as writing itself.209
We know nothing of “law” prior to recorded history. But if Mithen’s
theory is correct, the cognitive connections that facilitated art, science, and
religion also would have facilitated concepts of “law”—and the lack of such
connections would have meant that for early hominids/humans, there was no
“law.” And if Tattersall is correct, the acquisition of language would also have
facilitated the concept of law, particularly positive law with its concrete
expression in language.
The earliest small bands of hunter-gatherer hominids/humans, of course,
would have operated according to sets of social “rules.”210 Social rules are not
a uniquely human trait. Indeed, social ordering is a pervasive feature of the
animal kingdom. Even insects, such as honeybees, can show intricate social
ordering.211 “Dumb” farm animals, such as the chickens I have begun raising
in my backyard, are socially strict creatures—hence the term “pecking
order.”212 Other higher mammals, such as whales, dolphins, and elephants,
display detailed social ordering with local cultural variations.213 Modern
chimpanzee bands possess elaborate cultural norms that regulate access to
food, access to sex, access to affection, and even what we might
anthropomorphically call “war” with other tribes.214 Observations of
chimpanzee and bonobo social ordering provide the raw material for many
game-theoretic studies of human evolutionary psychology.215
But it seems clear that even the most socially “advanced” of the higher
mammals do not possess concepts of social order closely akin to what we call
“law.” A dominant animal in the pack might perform a sort of “judicial”

209. See JOHN HAYWOOD ET AL., HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ANCIENT WORLD § 1.07
(1998) (The earliest written documents are Sumerian clay tablets that date to about 3400 B.C.).
210. For a discussion of the game theoretic analysis of social traits in evolutionary biology,
see Zachary Ernst, Game Theory in Evolutionary Biology, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO
THE PHILOSOPHY OF BIOLOGY 304 (David L. Hull & Michael Ruse eds., 2007).
211. See Web Focus: Honeybee Genome, NATURE, http://www.nature.com/nature/focus/
honeybee/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2013) (noting that “[h]oneybees have fascinating social structure
and advanced societies despite having brains that are five orders of magnitude smaller than
humans.”).
212. See PAM PERCY, THE FIELD GUIDE TO CHICKENS 39 (2006); JEROME D. BELANGER,
THE COMPLETE IDIOT’S GUIDE TO RAISING CHICKENS 74 (2010) (discussing the social
organization practices of chickens). For a picture of two of my chickens, see FLICKR,
http://www.flickr.com/photos/dopderbeck/8635657888/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2013).
213. See EDWARD O. WILSON, SOCIOBIOLOGY: THE NEW SYNTHESIS 457–66 (2000)
(discussing the detailed social ordering of various species).
214. See FRANS DE WAAL, CHIMPANZEE POLITICS: POWER AND SEX AMONG APES 169
(2007); CHRISTOPHE BOESCH, THE REAL CHIMPANZEE: SEX STRATEGIES IN THE FOREST 102
(2009).
215. See generally DE WAAL, supra note 214; BOESCH, supra note 214.
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function by forcibly ending disputes, but there is nothing like a well-defined
set of juridical procedures or principles. Most significantly, even these highest
of social mammals appear to have no concept of binding abstract principles
that would support a “rule of law.” The “law” for them finally is, literally, the
“law of the jungle”—chemistry, instinct, material and reproductive advantage,
and force.
If we humans know a concept of “law” that refers the “legitimate” rule of
law to abstract principles—indeed if we know even a concept of
“legitimacy”—this requires a sort of cognitive capacity that only we humans,
of all the creatures on Earth, seem to possess. Could it be that the same
cognitive breakthroughs that facilitated the creative explosion in language, art,
technology, and religion also were necessary to the development of “law”?
Indeed, could it be that an essential part of what marks us “human” is just this
sense of transcendent “law”?
B.

Chastened NeuroLaw and Legal Constructivism

Contrary to Eagleman and Harris, some neuroLaw scholars recognize the
need for caution when reframing concepts of positive law, particularly in light
of the extravagant possibilities seemingly opened up by neuroscience. Stephen
J. Morse, a law professor and Associate Director of the Center of Neuroscience
and Society at the University of Pennsylvania, asks “why so many enthusiasts
seem to have extravagant expectations about the contributions of neuroscience
to law, especially criminal law.”216 Morse suggests that:
Many people intensely dislike the concept and practice of retributive justice,
thinking that they are prescientific and harsh. Their hope is that the new
neuroscience will convince the law at last that determinism is true, no offender
is genuinely responsible, and the only logical conclusion is that the law should
adopt a consequentially based prediction/ prevention system of social control
guided by the knowledge of the neuroscientist-kings who will finally have
217
supplanted the platonic philosopher-kings.

More careful neuroLaw scholars recognize some of the problems with
reductionism. As Morse notes:
[T]he arguments and evidence that [reductive neuroLaw scholars] use to
convince others presuppose the folk-psychological view of the person. Brains
do not convince each other, people do. Folk psychology presupposes only that
human action will at least be rationalizable by mental state explanations or will
218
be response to reasons—including incentives—under the right conditions.

216. Stephen J. Morse, The Status of NeuroLaw: A Plea for Current Modesty and Future
Cautious Optimism, 39 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 595, 598 (2012).
217. Id.
218. Id. at 599.
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Morse notes that “[t]he legal view of the person does not hold that people
must always reason or consistently behave rationally according to some
preordained, normative notion of rationality.”219 Instead, he argues, the law
requires only that people be capable of “minimal rationality according to
predominantly conventional, socially constructed standards.”220 Such a notion
of minimal rationality is important because law governs people, not machines:
Machines may cause harm, but they cannot do wrong, and they cannot violate
expectations about how people ought to live together. Machines do not deserve
praise, blame, reward, punishment, concern, or respect because they exist or
because of the results they cause. Only people, intentional agents with the
potential to act, can do wrong and violate expectations of what they owe each
221
other.

“If human beings were not rational creatures who could understand the good
reasons for action and were not capable of conforming to legal requirements
through intentional action or forbearance,” Morse reminds us, “the law could
not adequately guide action and would not be just.”222
Nevertheless, Morse argues that even if neuroscience destroys any concept
of human free will, this would not matter one bit for legal doctrine.223 Morse
argues that “[c]riminal law doctrines are fully consistent with the truth of
determinism or universal causation that allegedly undermines the foundations
of responsibility. Even if determinism is true, some people act and some
people do not.”224
In one sense, Morse is correct. A society could continue to employ legal
doctrines that govern behaviors even if those behaviors are unfree. And even
where legal doctrines govern mental states—such as the mens rea requirement
in criminal law—the law could define those states with reference to the
absence of certain kinds of constraints on action, such as unusual behavioral
states defined as “insanity.” But what Morse does not admit is that this would
represent a radically different concept of “law” than what has historically
obtained in Western culture. In particular, this conception would sever the
notion of “law” from the notion of “justice.” Why ought a society enact laws
that discourage some behaviors and encourage others? That is a question of
justice. Without some concept of human freedom, there is no concept of
justice, at least not in any sense familiar to our sense of “law.”
Later in the same article, Morse seems to recognize this conundrum. He
notes that “[d]espite our lack of understanding of the mind-brain-action
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relation, some scientists and philosophers question whether mental states have
any causal effect, thus treating mental states as psychic appendixes that
evolution has created but that have no genuine function.”225 This claim, he
admits, is made by “serious, thoughtful people,” and if true, “would create a
complete and revolutionary paradigm shift in the law of criminal responsibility
and competence (and more widely).”226 Nevertheless, Morse suggests, “given
our current state of knowledge, there is little scientific or conceptual reason to
accept” this broader critique.227 It seems that Morse thinks some concept of
supervenience might preserve at least some concept of intentionality that
would underwrite some idea of rationality and justice in the law. And yet,
Morse assures us, “Most informed people are not dualists concerning the
relation between the mind and the brain. That is, they no longer think our
minds—or souls—are independent of our brains and bodies more generally
and can somehow exert a causal influence over our bodies.”228 It seems that
Morse wants his materialist cake with Aristotelian icing.
C. NeuroLaw and a Modernized Aristotelianism
A few bold philosophers and legal scholars have more directly taken
neuroLaw to task for its reductionism of “mind” to “brain.”229 Michael Pardo
and Dennis Patterson, in their article Philosophical Foundations of Law and
Neuroscience, observe that:
If anything unites the various problems and projects of neurolegalists, it is
the belief that the mind and the brain are one. This belief has spread far beyond
neurolegalists, for it is a pervasive feature of much of the current literature and
230
research in neuroscience as well as more popular writings.

Yet, Pardo and Patterson ask, “[D]oes it make sense to attribute to the brain
psychological attributes normally attributed to persons? Can we intelligibly say
that the brain thinks, perceives, feels pain, and decides? If we cannot, what are
the implications for neuroscience and law?”231
Pardo and Patterson believe that the reduction of “mind” to “brain” is a
category mistake.232 Nevertheless, they reject what they describe as the
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See THOMAS NAGEL, MIND AND COSMOS 4–5 (2012); CHARLES LANDESMAN,
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“Cartesian dualism” that posits the “mind” as a separate “substance” or
“entity.”233 Instead, they opt for a phenomenological distinction between
“behavior, reactions, and responses of the living human being in the stream of
life” and the “[b]rain functions and activities” that relate to these behaviors,
reactions, and responses.234 “This is the key,” they claim, “to the mereological
fallacy and the undoing of the reductive impulses of neurolegalists.” They
continue:
Behavior is something only a human being (or other animal) can engage in.
Brain functions and activities are not behaviors (and persons are not their
brains). Yes, it is necessary that one have a brain in order to engage in
behavior. But the reduction of a psychological attribute to a cortical attribute is
235
a fallacious move from whole to part.

A key aspect of Pardo and Patterson’s critique is the interpretation of the
relation between empirical observations of brain states and specific behaviors.
For example, Pardo and Patterson criticize a “neuroeconomics” study of
activity in different brain regions triggered by monetary offers in an ultimatum
game.236 The authors of the study concluded that different brain regions fire
when the offer is perceived to be “unfair,” and suggested that legal rules
(presumably regarding information disclosures) could be tweaked to mitigate
bad economic choices.237 Pardo and Patterson conclude that:
The evidence does not support their interpretations. First, it makes no sense
to say that the brain “decides,” “reasons,” or “adjudicates” anything. Second,
all that the neuroscientific evidence shows with regard to the ultimatum game
is what subjects' brains were doing while they (the subjects) were deciding
whether to accept or reject the offer. Consider the following analogy. Suppose
one's face turned red whenever he was angry. Now, suppose when faced with
an unfair offer in the ultimatum game, his face turned red right before he
rejected the offer. Surely we would not say that the person's face rejected the
offer—why, then, conclude that his insula cortex did so because it too turned
238
colors on an fMRI machine?

But if Pardo and Patterson reject what they consider the Cartesian-dualist
and reductionist accounts of the mind-brain relation, what do they offer
instead? They propose that “[t]he mind is not an entity or substance at all
(whether non-physical or physical). To have a mind is to possess a certain
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array of rational powers exhibited in thought, feeling, and action.”239 This
concept, they suggest, is rooted in Aristotle. As they interpret Aristotle:
[T]he mind is not a part of the person that causally interacts with the person's
body. It is just the mental powers, abilities, and capacities possessed by
humans. Likewise, the ability to see is not a part of the eye that interacts with
other parts of the physical eye. Under this conception, the question of the
mind's location in the body makes no sense just as the location of eyesight
240
within the eye makes no sense.

They argue that this Aristotelian concept is “materialist/physicalist” in the
sense that to lose the brain is also to lose the mind, but that it is nonreductive
because “the mind is not identical with the brain.”241 And this means that,
although neuroscience can contribute to law, it cannot overtake law.242
Pardo and Patterson have done a great service in debunking some of the
grander claims of neuroLaw and in introducing Aristotle back into the mix. But
Pardo and Patterson are careful to steer away from Aristotelian notions of
causation. They invoke Aristotle as a sort of paradigmatic example of holism
in the mind-body relation, but without offering the context for Aristotle’s
hylomorphism, which finally only makes sense within a thicker metaphysical
matrix than that to which Pardo and Patterson are prepared to commit. The
next section explores such a thicker matrix.
D. Revitalizing a Sense of Aristotelian Causation in the Law
In his treatise “On the Soul,” Aristotle indeed stated that the “soul” and the
“body” are inseparable. For example, comparing the soul to the potential
power of a cutting tool and relating it to the power of sight, Aristotle said,
“[T]he soul is actuality in the sense corresponding to the power of sight and the
power in the tool; the body corresponds to what exists in potentiality; as the
pupil plus the power of sight constitutes the eye, so the soul plus the body
constitutes the animal.”243Yet Aristotle never simply equated the soul with
bodily functions. For example, he noted that “all those who define the soul by
its power of knowing make it either an element or constructed out of the
elements,” and he is keen to refute this sort of reductionism.244 Instead, for
Aristotle, the soul is the form or source of the body:
The soul is the cause or source of the living body. The terms cause and
source have many senses. But the soul is the cause of its body alike in all three
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senses which we explicitly recognize. It is (a) the source or origin of
245
movement, it is (b) the end, it is (c) the essence of the whole living body.

This reference to causation, source, and movement refers to Aristotle’s concept
of causation.
Aristotle recognized four kinds or aspects of causation: material, formal,
efficient, and final.246 The material cause is that out of which something
comes, such as the bronze of a statue.247 The formal cause is the form or
account of what it is to be something, such as the shape of a statue.248 The
efficient cause is the primary source of change or rest, such as the sculptor who
chips away at the marble.249 The final cause is the end for which something is
done, such as the production of a sculpture.250
Modern science recognizes only efficient causes.251 While this may be an
important methodological limitation, it is unwarranted, without further
explanation, as an overarching metaphysic. Moreover, an Aristotelian or neoAristotelian notion of “mind” (or “soul”) requires all these various senses of
causation, and in particular final causation.252 If some sort of Aristotelian
anthropology is a response to reductive neuroLaw, then we must speak of
where “law” comes from, what it means for “law” to be “law,” and of the ends
or purposes of “law.” That is, we must speak of “law” as having some
transcendent telos, some source that also implies its ends.
Reductive neuroLaw by definition offers no such transcendent sources or
ends. In neuroLaw’s state of pure nature there is no procedure for deriving how
humans “ought” to live from the “is” of neurobiology. At any moment in the
flow of evolutionary time, it might be possible to describe a fitness landscape
of human behaviors, with highly localized accounts of an ordinary distribution
of behavior ranges. Yet there is no principled way to construct a legal system
that would seek to “correct” any particular behavior along any of these
behavioral fitness curves. The act of attempting to effect such “corrections”
itself would simply represent another adaptive behavior. And the legal
machinery necessary to implement such corrective action necessarily would
imply mere force and violence.

245. Id. at 39 (emphasis added).
246. See, e.g., Andrea Falcon, Aristotle on Causality, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Oct.
15, 2012), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-causality/.
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251. For a discussion of causation in modern science, see Nancey Murphy, Divine Action,
Emergence and Scientific Explanation, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO SCIENCE AND
RELIGION 244, 244–47 (Peter Harrison ed., 2010).
252. See Christopher Shields, Aristotle’s Psychology, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Aug.
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Reductive neuroLaw therefore offers nothing other than the purposeless
meander of natural selection. It is pure force—the “force of the law” without
law. Thus, the legal system of reductive neuroLaw would perfectly enact the
state of exception from the law.253 With no rule of law, the will of the most
powerful persons or groups would marginalize, exclude, control, and
eventually replace and extinguish the less powerful, until the race of humanity
is comprised only of the master race—except that not even the promised
master race would make its parousia, since the fitness landscape changes and
the cycle of competition is a world without end.254 Indeed, the pure nature
imagined by reductive neuroLaw destroys even “nature” itself. There is no
whole “nature” that selects for its parts, and there are no parts oriented towards
a whole. Finally, only these three remain—time, energy, and change—and the
greatest of these is change.255
V. CONCLUSION: NEUROLAW AS A STATE OF EXCEPTION
In his book Homo Sacer, Italian political philosopher Giorgio Agamben
observes that in the state of exception the law is “suspended.”256 When faced
with a perceived threat or emergency, the sovereign declares a “state of
exception” under which the ordinary rules of procedure, evidence, and
judgment no longer apply.257 In the state of exception there is no law but the
will of the sovereign, and thus there is no “law” at all.258
Agamben highlights the problem of the relation between constituting and
constituted power. Constituted power is that which is exercised with an
existing state/juridical framework.259 Constituting power is that which
legitimates the state/juridical framework in the first instance.260 Agamben
suggests that the problem of constitutive power “is increasingly dismissed as a
prejudice or a merely factual matter,” creating a circularity by which the
problem of legitimate power simply is referred to a constitutional document,
which hangs in mid-air.261 The fundamental problem, he argues, is
metaphysical: what is the relation between potentiality (the possibility of

253. See GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER 15 (1998) (discussing the state of exception from
the law).
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constituting law) and actuality (law as constituted).262 “Until a new and
coherent ontology of potentiality . . . has replaced the ontology founded on the
primacy of actuality and its relation to potentiality,” he argues, “a political
theory freed from the aporias of sovereignty remains unthinkable.”263
Agamben demonstrates that this problem of constituting and constituted
law is a manifestation of the Aristotelian relationship between potentiality and
act, dynamis and energia.264 How, if at all, is potentiality different from act?
Potentiality in the Aristotelian sense, Agamben explains, is the ability not to do
or be: “Every potentiality is impotentiality of the same and with respect to the
same” or “‘What is potential can both be and not be.’”265 This means that when
potentiality passes into act, that which is potential “sets aside its own potential
not to be (its adynamia).”266 Therefore it is through potentiality that “[b]eing
founds itself sovereignly,” for the passage to actuality implies the sovereign
freedom not to be or act.267 And this means that constituting power is never
exhausted by constituted power. Sovereign power can remain in reserve, as
ungiven potentiality.268 As Conor Cunningham notes, Agamben plays on the
voluntarist notion of de potential absoluta.269
Here Agamben explores the figure of homo sacer, the person in Roman
law placed under the sacred ban.270 The homo sacer was not subject to
execution by the State, but neither was it a crime of homicide for anyone to kill
him.271 This placed the homo sacer paradoxically both under and outside the
law. The same dynamic, Agamben notes, was obtained in the Germanic
wargus, the “werewolf,” who is banned from the city and its law.272 Agamben
defines this as the origin of politics: “Not simple natural life, but life exposed
to death (bare life or sacred life) is the originary political element.”273
Agamben thereby deconstructs the Hobbesian response to the state of
nature: the city and its laws do not limit the violence of the state of nature, but
rather the state of nature exists within the city, in the human condition of bare
262. Id. at 44.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 45.
266. AGAMBEN, supra note 253, at 46. This is how Agamben construes Aristotle’s statement
that “[a] thing is said to be potential if, when the act of which it is said to be potential is realized,
there will be nothing im-potential (that is, there will be nothing able not to be).” Id. at 45.
267. Id. at 46.
268. Id.
269. Conor Cunningham, Nihilism and Theology: Who Stands at the Door?, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF THEOLOGY AND MODERN EUROPEAN THOUGHT 325, 340 (Nicholas Adams et al.
eds., 2013).
270. AGAMBEN, supra note 253, at 71, 73.
271. Id. at 71.
272. Id. at 104.
273. Id. at 88 (emphasis omitted).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2014]

THE PROBLEM WITH NEUROLAW

537

life, through which the citizen may become homo sacer/wolf-man in the state
of exception.274 The potential of the state of exception, moreover, bears within
the potential for the dissolution of the city itself: “The transformation into a
werewolf corresponds perfectly to the state of exception, during which
(necessarily limited) time the city is dissolved and men enter into a zone in
which they are no longer distinct from beasts.”275 Thus, “[t]he state of nature
is, in truth, a state of exception, in which the city appears for an instant (which
is at the same time a chronological interval and a nontemporal moment)
tanquam disoluta.”276
The paradigm of this dynamic, Agamben argues, is the concentration
camp. In the camp, the governing “law” is pure biopolitics, the assertion of
power over the body, as evidenced vividly in the gruesome Nazi medical
experiments on inmates.277 “The camp,” Agamben says, “was also the most
absolute biopolitical space ever to have been realized, in which power
confronts nothing but pure life, without any mediation.”278 “Law” and “fact”
become indistinguishable in the camp: the fact of bare life is law.279 And as
Western politics have come to define humanity in terms of bare life, to
perpetuate the state of exception, and thereby to declare all persons not persons
but rather homo sacer and wargus, the camp has superceded the city as our
basic political paradigm.280
Agamben does not resolve this aporia, but he concludes with an appeal to
reconstitute Western metaphysics.281 As Christian theologian Graham Ward
has noted, Agamben makes use of Pauline thinking about the person, about
faith and love, “but there is no analysis of the third in the Pauline trilogue of
virtues—hope.”282 Ward adopts Agamben’s critique of the state of exception
but only as a starting point to illuminate the contemporary situation and to
bring it into the light of Christian eschatological hope.283
Earlier in his essay on Homo Sacer, Agamben refers to an article by
Emmanuel Levinas, Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism.284 In that
essay, Levinas locates the philosophy of National Socialism in “the essential
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possibility of elemental Evil into which we can be led by logic and against
which Western philosophy had not sufficiently insured itself.”285
Within the Jewish and Christian traditions, Levinas argued, human beings
are free to transcend the vicissitudes of history, including of their own personal
histories.286 “This freedom,” he said, “which is infinite with regard to any
attachment and through which no attachment is ultimately definitive, lies at the
base of the Christian notion of the soul.”287 Although the body remains stuck in
the slipstream of history, through renewal of the soul a person “can regain the
nudity he had during the first days of creation.”288 Because each soul always
retains this potential to renew itself, there remains an “equal dignity of each
and every soul, which is independent of the material or social conditions of
people.”289 Indeed, freedom from history is the ultimate freedom:
The salvation that Christianity wishes to bring us lies in the way it promises to
reopen the finality brought about by the flow of moments of a past that is
forever challenged, forever called into question, to go beyond the absolute
290
contradiction of a past that is subordinate to the present.

The modern alternatives to this paradigm, for Levinas, were liberalism,
Marxism, and National Socialism.291 Each of these programs displaced the
notion of the soul.
For Levinas, liberalism retained the notion of choice but replaced the soul
with a Kantian realm of pure, dispassionate reason.292 This produced
dislocation and skepticism, which attempt to keep concrete human history at a
distance.293 The seeds of National Socialism are present in this paradigm,
because “[t]hought becomes a game.”294 People shy away from personal
commitment to spiritual values.295
Materialist Marxism “confused the self [le moi] with the body . . . at the
price of a pure and simple negation of the spirit.”296 Thus, the Marxists “placed
the body in nature, and accorded it no exceptional standing in the Universe.”297
For such materialists, “the whole of the spirit’s essence lies in the fact that it is
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chained to the body.”298 Here again are seeds of National Socialism’s exercise
of power over the body.
National Socialism, in turn, replaced the soul with ideas. These were not
ideas freely appropriated by reason, thereby creating a community of peers.299
Rather, these were a framework of ideas—the Blut und Boden of the Aryan
ideal of history—propagated by force.300 The violence attached to ideas
propagated by force does not dissipate when the ideas find acquiescence in
subjects. Instead, the force remains, universalizing one final ideal: “war and
conquest.”301
Reductive neuroLaw now seeks to complete this trajectory: Kantian “pure”
reason, stripped of moral sentiment, combined with Marxism’s reduction of
“person” to “body” and National Socialism’s replacement of “law” with
violence, to yield a final solution for control over “life” through “neural
reeducation.” The great philosophical and theological traditions, both East and
West, offer rich metaphysical resources for resisting this trend towards
biopolitical nihilism. It is a trend to be resisted at the cost of “life” itself.

298. Id.
299. See id. at 69–70. In an authentic community of ideas, Levinas says:
The idea propagated detaches itself essentially from its point of departure. In spite of
the unique accent communicated to it by its creator, it becomes a common heritage. It is
fundamentally anonymous. The person who accepts it becomes its master, as does the
person who proposes it. The propagation of an idea thus creates a community of
‘masters’; it is a process of equalization. To convert or persuade is to create peers.
Id. at 70.
300. Levinas, supra note 284, at 70.
301. Id. at 71.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

540

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 58:497

